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Abstract 
This paper seeks to clarify the confusions regarding the relationships between international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law, the principle of equality of belligerents, and the use 
of the term “should” in treaties. For this purpose, it examines, as a case study, the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, on 
which doctrine is divided whether Article 4(1) thereof is binding on armed non-State actors. First, 
this paper reconceptualizes international humanitarian law as a subset of international human rights 
law, which share the same purpose, mutually reinforce, and depend on each other. Second, drawing 
on the customary rules of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
and through a comprehensive analysis of the authentic texts in other languages and the travaux 
préparatoires, it argues that the term “should” in the operative part of treaties always creates legally 
binding obligations and that the equality principle does not strictly apply to norms applicable during 
peacetime. As such, despite its use of “should” and differential treatment between States and armed 
non-State actors, Article 4(1) of the Protocol creates a direct human rights obligation on armed non-
State actors. 
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2 
Introduction	  
 
Today, it is generally accepted that armed non-State actors (ANSAs)1 that are parties to an armed 
conflict are legally bound by international humanitarian law (IHL),2 especially Common Article 3 
of the four Geneva Conventions (CA3) and, if applicable, the Additional Protocol II of 1977 to the 
Geneva Conventions (AP II).3 ANSAs are also bound by any customary norms applicable to them.4 
Scholars generally claim that ANSAs that have not consented to the rules are nonetheless bound by 
IHL because States, exercising their “effective sovereignty”, may apply legally binding rules on 
their territory by means of treaties,5 and because “all parties to a conflict [(States and ANSAs)] must 
be treated on foot of equality” to ensure compliance.6 However, doctrine is divided on whether 
                                                
1 The term “armed non-State actors” (ANSAs) is used throughout this paper to refer to “armed groups that are distinct 
from the armed forces of a State”, regardless of whether they are parties to an armed conflict or not. For the purposes of 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 
the term “ANSAs” apply to any such groups that are capable of recruiting and/or using in hostilities persons under the 
age of 18 years.  
2 The term “international humanitarian law” (IHL) is used in this paper to refer to a set of norms applicable only during 
(international or non-international) armed conflict rather than a set of norms stemming from the so-called IHL treaties 
such as the Hague Conventions, the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, as commonly understood.  
3 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non- International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 609. For the claim that ANSAs are bound by IHL, see, for example, A. 
Clapham, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations’ 88(863) IRRC 491 (2006), at 492-
493; J.-M. Henckaerts and C. Wiesener, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Armed Groups: a Possible 
Contribution from Customary International Law?’, in R. Kolb and G. Gaggioli (eds.), Research Handbook on Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law 146 (2013), at 149. 
4 Judgment, Kallon, Kamara, Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, Case No. SCSL-04-15-PT-
060, SCSL, 13 March 2004, paras. 45, 47. Here, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) has held that “there is now 
no doubt that [Common Article 3] is binding on States and insurgents alike, and that insurgents are subject to 
international humanitarian law [...] [a] convincing theory is that [insurgents] are bound as a matter of customary 
international law to observe the obligations declared by [Common Article 3] which is aimed at the protection of 
humanity”. 
5 J.S. Pictet et al. (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary IV, Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War (1960) (Commentary IV), at 37.  
6 A. Sheppard, ‘Child soldiers: Is the optional protocol evidence of an emerging “straight-18” consensus?’, 8(1) The 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 37 (2000), at 53. For a discussion on different theories of why ANSAs that 
are parties to an armed conflict are bound by IHL, see C. Ryngaert, ‘Non-State Actors and International Humanitarian 
Law’, The Institute for International Law Working Paper No. 146, 2008, at 3-11. 
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ANSAs have obligations under general human rights law (GHRL).7 While many legal scholars 
emphasize the existence of ANSA’s GHRL obligations, the deep-rooted, traditional view according 
to which “only States have obligations under international human rights law”8 is equally strong 
within academia. There are two reasons why they are against extending GHRL obligations to 
ANSAs, which correspond to the two aforementioned arguments leading to ANSAs’ obligations 
under IHL. First, unlike CA3 and AP II, the drafters’ intention to bind ANSAs is not clear in most 
GHRL treaties. Second, many traditional lawyers who perceive IHL as an autonomous regime are 
reluctant to extend GHRL obligations to ANSAs because “unlike humanitarian law, human rights 
law is based on a vertical relationship between the state and the individual”,9 rather than a 
horizontal relationship in which States and ANSAs are treated equally.   
There is one human rights treaty10 that fundamentally challenges this traditional view: the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict (OP), which is considered “a sui generis human rights treaty”.11 Article 4 of the OP 
provides:  
  
1. Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any 
circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years. 
                                                
7 The term “general human rights law” (GHRL) refers to a set of norms seeking to promote human rights and dignity 
which apply at all time (during peacetime and armed conflict), as opposed to IHL norms which only apply during armed 
conflict. Both GHRL and IHL are subsets of international human rights law (IHRL), a set of norms seeking to promote 
human rights and dignity. IHRL includes GHRL and IHL as well as special GHRL/IHL norms that only apply to certain 
groups of people (e.g. children, refugees, prisoners of war). This paper differentiates GHRL norms and IHL norms 
through the applicability of norms, although the majority of contemporary authors use “IHL” to refer to any norms 
related to armed conflict or norms stemming from the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations, because many 
norms related to armed conflict may not be clearly distinguished by the nature or sources of the norms. For example, 
provisions relating to the right to a fair trial under the Geneva Conventions are IHL norms because they are only 
applicable during armed conflict while similar provisions under the ICCPR are GHRL norms because they also apply 
during peacetime. Similarly, provisions concerning the dissemination of Geneva Conventions are GHRL norms because 
they are applicable during peacetime although they are found within so-called IHL treaties. 
8 UNICEF, Guide to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2003), at 17. 
9 Henckaerts and Wiesener, supra note 3, at 147. 
10 The reporter of the Working Group on a Draft Optional Protocol states, “It was also emphasized that the protocol 
should be seen as a human rights instrument”: E/CN.4/1995/96, 10 February 1995, para. 21. Here, “a human rights 
instrument” is used to refer to a GHRL instrument, which mainly contains provisions that are applicable during both 
peacetime and armed conflict. Note that the so-called IHL instruments such as the Geneva Conventions are also human 
rights treaties, although not GHRL instruments. See supra note 7. 
11 Henckaerts and Wiesener, supra note 3, at 148. 
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2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use, 
including the adoption of legal measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such 
practices. 
3. The application of the present article under this Protocol shall not affect the legal 
status of any party to an armed conflict.  
 
From this wording, Article 4(1) appears to impose a legal obligation on ANSAs, namely the 
obligation to not recruit or use in hostilities persons under 18.12 Further, Articles 313 and 4, when 
read in conjunction, seem to create horizontal obligations between States and ANSAs.14 Many 
                                                
12 Recruitment refers to “compulsory, forced and voluntary conscription or enlistment of children into any kind of 
armed force or armed group” whereas use in hostilities mean the use of children “by an armed force or armed group in 
any capacity, including but not limited to [... their use]  as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual 
purposes”: 2007 Paris Principles on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, paras. 2.1, 2.4. 
13 Article 3 provides:  
1. States Parties shall raise the minimum age for the voluntary recruitment of persons into their national 
armed forces from that set out in article 38, paragraph 3, of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
taking account of the principles contained in that article and recognizing that under the Convention 
persons under the age of 18 years are entitled to special protection. 
2. Each State Party shall deposit a binding declaration upon ratification of or accession to the present 
Protocol that sets forth the minimum age at which it will permit voluntary recruitment into its national 
armed forces and a description of the safeguards it has adopted to ensure that such recruitment is not 
forced or coerced. 
3. States Parties that permit voluntary recruitment into their national armed forces under the age of 18 
years shall maintain safeguards to ensure, as a minimum, that: 
(a) Such recruitment is genuinely voluntary; 
(b) Such recruitment is carried out with the informed consent of the person's parents or legal guardians; 
(c) Such persons are fully informed of the duties involved in such military service; 
(d) Such persons provide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into national military service. 
4. Each State Party may strengthen its declaration at any time by notification to that effect addressed to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall inform all States Parties. Such notification shall 
take effect on the date on which it is received by the Secretary-General. 
5. The requirement to raise the age in paragraph 1 of the present article does not apply to schools operated 
by or under the control of the armed forces of the States Parties, in keeping with articles 28 and 29 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
14 W. Kälin, ‘Universal Human Rights Bodies and International Humanitarian Law’, in R. Kolb and G. Gaggioli (eds.), 
Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 441 (2013), at 446. 
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highly qualified publicists state that ANSAs are bound by Article 4(1).15 As Clapham asserts, “it is 
assumed that this is a norm found in a human rights treaty which is binding on the non-state armed 
group”.16 However, several authors,17 as well as UNICEF,18 claim that Article 4(1) merely creates a 
                                                
15 See for example: Henckaerts and Wiesener, supra note 3, at 148; M. Happold, ‘Child Recruitment as a Crime under 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, in J. Doria et al. (eds.), The Legal Regime of the International 
Criminal Court: Essays in Memory of Igor Blischenko 579 (2010), at 582, where he states, “Armed forces distinct from 
the armed forces of a State are prohibited from recruiting any children”; A. Bellal, G. Giacca and S. Casey-Maslen, 
‘International law and armed non-state actors in Afghanistan’, in 93(881) IRRC 47 (2011), at 66, where they state, 
“Although the Security Council is not applying the Optional Protocol as such, practice at international level suggests 
that armed groups are widely considered to be bound by this norm [of not recruiting children under the age of 18 years] 
”; R. Coomaraswamy, ‘The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict; Towards Universal Ratification’, in 18(4) The International Journal of Children’s Rights 
535 (2010), at 540, where she states that “armed groups are prohibited from recruiting, either forcibly or voluntarily, 
persons under eighteen or using them in hostilities”; B. Docherty, ‘Breaking New Ground: The Convention on Cluster 
Munitions and the Evolution of International Humanitarian Law’, 31(4) Human Rights Quarterly 934 (2009), at 961, 
where it is stated “With these provisions, the Child Soldiers Protocol creates international law to govern NSAGs as well 
as states parties”; H. Cullen, The Role of International Law in the Elimination of Child Labor (2007), at 118, where it is 
stated “Article 4 of the Optional Protocol places an absolute obligation on non-state forces not to recruit children”; R. 
Stohl, ‘Children in Conflict: Assessing the Optional Protocol’, 2(2) Conflict, Security & Development 135 (2002), at 
138, where she states, “while governments are allowed to recruit under-18s into their militaries, non-state groups are 
prohibited from doing so”; A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (2006), at 75. On this issue, the 
position of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) remains ambiguous. On the one hand, the ICRC cites 
the OP to assert that the prohibition of recruiting child soldiers also applies to armed groups involved in armed 
conflicts: ICRC, The Domestic Implementation of International Humanitarian Law: a Manual (2011), Annex at 239. 
On the other hand, the ICRC stated in 2000 that Article 4(1) “imposed a moral, as opposed to legal, obligation under 
international law”: E/CN.4/2000/WG.13/CRP.1/Rev.1, 16 February 2000, para. 108. 
16 A. Clapham, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Organized Armed Groups’, in International Institute for Humanitarian 
Law, Non-state Actors and International Humanitarian Law Organized Armed Groups: a Challenge for the 21st 
Century 102 (2010), at 103. 
17 T. Vandewiele, Optional Protocol: The Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts (A Commentary on the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child) (2006), paras. 61 and 63; C. Ryngaert, ‘Human Rights Obligations of 
Armed Groups’, 41 Revue Belge de Droit International 364 (2008), at 364–365; D. Helle, ‘Optional Protocol on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict to the Convention on the Rights of the Child’, 82(839) IRRC 797 (2000), at 
801; S. Sivakumaran, ‘Re-envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed Conflict’, 22(1) European Journal of 
International Law 219 (2011), p. 249; R. Brett, ‘Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OP/CAC)’, International Council on Human Rights Policy and 
International Commission of Jurists Workshop Standard-Setting: Lessons Learned For The Future, Geneva, 13-14 
February 2005, para. 6.  
18 UNICEF, supra note 8, at 17. 
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moral obligation on such entities, as opposed to a legal obligation. Their arguments are premised on 
the two aforementioned reasons against extending GHRL obligations to ANSAs. First, they argue 
that “the wording ‘should not’, as opposed to ‘shall not’, imposes a moral, as opposed to a legal 
obligation under international law”.19 Second, given that Article 3 of the OP allows States Parties to 
conduct voluntary recruitment of persons under the age of 18 years, yet prohibits such recruitment 
by ANSAs – either voluntarily or compulsorily – imposes a double-standard which violates the 
principle of equality.20 Provisions in contradiction with the principle of equality, in their view, may 
not create legal obligations, because it is difficult to ensure compliance of the belligerent that 
perceives to be treated with unfair rules.  
These arguments are deeply rooted in the “general reluctance by States, academics and 
institutions to view human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law as branches of an 
interconnected, holistic regime”. 21  However, all three branches form one regime, namely 
international human rights law (IHRL),22 which seeks to promote the idea that “[a]ll human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights”.23 The professional bias to consider IHL as an 
autonomous system distinct from IHRL has caused the misconception that the equality principle 
applies strictly during both peacetime and armed conflict. It has also caused confusion about the 
meaning of “should” in legally binding treaties. In addition, the existing literature on the OP 
includes neither a comprehensive analysis of travaux préparatoires to clarify the intention of the 
drafters, nor a comparative study on the word “should” in other treaties and other languages. This 
paper seeks to fill such gaps in the literature and argues that under Article 4(1) of the OP, ANSAs 
have a direct human rights obligation to not recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 
years.  
                                                
19 Helle, supra note 17, at 801. 
20 Ibid. For instance, Helle states that Article 4(1) merely imposes a moral obligation because “the obligation imposed 
on non-State entities differs from, and is wider than, that imposed on States”. 
21 J. McAdam, ‘The Refugee Convention as a Rights Blueprint for Persons in Need of International Protection’, in J. 
McAdam (ed.), Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security (2008), at 263. It shall be noted that she categorizes 
branches of law according to sources of norms (e.g. refugee law stemming from the 1951 Convention). 
22 See supra note 7 for the definition of IHRL. 
23 Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For a discussion on the professional biases among different 
legal disciplines, see, for example, V. Chetail, ‘Armed Conflict and Forced Migration: A Systemic Approach to 
International Humanitarian Law, Refugee Law and Human Rights Law’, in A. Clapham and P. Gaeta (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict 700 (2014), at 701. Chetail states, “While sharing the same purpose 
of protecting individuals against abuses, international humanitarian law, refugee law, and human rights law have largely 
evolved around their own specific sources, institutions, and ethos”. 
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First, this paper reconceptualizes the relationship between IHRL and IHL and clarifies the 
nature of the equality principle. Second, applying the customary rules of treaty interpretation under 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),24 it argues that the object and purpose of the 
OP is to prohibit ANSAs from recruiting child soldiers during peacetime, which both the CRC and 
IHL treaties have failed to address. Third, both external and internal contexts of the OP suggest that 
Article 4(1) is binding on ANSAs. Fourth, this paper elucidates the meaning of “should” in treaties 
through a comparative study of a number of treaties in all their authentic languages. Fifth, through a 
comprehensive analysis of the travaux préparatoires, this paper explains the reasons why the 
drafters have decided to use the word “should” instead of “shall” and imposed different obligations 
on States and ANSAs. Finally, a study of the subsequent practice of both States and ANSAs 
indicates that they consider Article 4(1) to be legally binding. 
 
 
1. Reconceptualizing the Relationship Between IHRL and IHL: the Equality 
Principle under General International Law 
 
The purpose of IHRL is to promote human rights and dignity and, as such, it has multiple functions. 
First, IHRL guarantees certain rights for everyone at all time, regardless of their status or the 
situation (GHRL). Second, certain IHRL norms seek to humanize the effects of armed conflict by 
protecting individuals who are not (or no longer) participating in hostilities and by limiting the 
means and methods of warfare. Many of these norms are only applicable during armed conflict 
(IHL). Third, in order to protect certain groups of vulnerable people, such as children, refugees, and 
prisoners of war, IHRL – within both GHRL and IHL – contains norms that apply to these groups 
specifically, as exemplified by the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC’)25 the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the 1951 Convention),26 and the third Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,27 respectively.28 As such, similar to 
                                                
24 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331. 
25 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 3. 
26 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 137. 
27 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 75 UNTS 135 
28 Note that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples also deal with the rights of vulnerable groups. 
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refugee protection, IHL is a subset of IHRL, which seeks to promote human rights and dignity 
during armed conflict.29 
 
While most norms concerning armed conflicts are only applicable during hostilities, there are 
some rules that also apply during peacetime, which may be found within so-called IHL treaties as 
well as other treaties. For instance, the obligation to disseminate IHL under the Geneva 
Conventions, applies “in time of peace and in time of war”.30 Similarly, disarmament treaties 
limiting the means and methods of warfare – including the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 
(CWC)31 – apply during both peacetime and armed conflict.32 In a similar vein, Article 38 of the 
CRC prohibits the recruitment and use of child soldiers not only during armed conflict but also in 
peacetime. Article 38 provides that “States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that 
persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities” and 
“refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed 
force”.33 While the direct participation in hostilities occurs during armed conflict, States Parties are 
required to take all feasible measures to prevent it (e.g. through education) and to refrain from 
                                                
29 UNHCR, Introduction à la protection internationale des réfugiés (Module de formation, Geneva June 1992) at 19, 
cited in J. Sztucki, ‘Who Is a Refugee? The Convention Definition: Universal or Obsolete?’, in F. Nicholson and P. 
Twomey (eds.), Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes Nicholson and Twomey 
(1999), at 63. UNHCR’s training manual states that “international refugee law, like humanitarian law, is in fact a branch 
of human rights law”. For a discussion on the relationships between different subsets of IHRL, see in general: Chetail, 
supra note 23; A. Edwards, “Crossing Legal Borders: The Interface between Refugee Law, Human Rights Law and 
Humanitarian Law in the ‘International Protection’ of Refugees,” in R. Arnold and N. Quenivet (eds.) International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights: Towards a New Merger in International Law 421 (2008). 
30 Article 47 of GC I, Article 48 of GC II, Article 127 of GC III, and Article 144 of GC IV. 
31 1992 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
on their Destruction, 1974 UNTS 45. 
32 Article 1 provides: “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances: (a) To develop, 
produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons 
to anyone; (b) To use chemical weapons [...].” While the use of chemical weapons generally occurs during armed 
conflict, it is a norm under GHRL because it applies during peacetime as well. 
33 F. Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts (2006), para. 9. According to this commentary, “Article 38 of the 
CRC is clearly an IHL provision. Yet formally speaking, Article 38 is part of a human rights instrument”. Ang seems to 
use the term IHL to refer to a set of norms that pertain to armed conflicts, regardless of whether they are applicable 
during peacetime.  
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recruiting children into their armed forces during peacetime. The drafters of the CRC formulated 
Article 38 on the basis of Article 77 of Additional Protocol I34 (AP I),35 which provides that:  
 
Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have 
not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in 
particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces.  
 
Article 38 of the CRC reinforces Article 77 of AP I, which only applies during armed conflict given 
the expression “Parties to the conflict”.36 As Happold states, 
 
It appears that the regulation of the recruitment of child soldiers is now a human rights 
issue, not only one within the corpus of international humanitarian law, or, rather, that, 
with regard to the issue of child combatants, the two bodies of law have merged, with 
human rights considerations infiltrating the body of international humanitarian law.37 
 
Given that IHRL is a holistic regime, some norms concerning armed conflict apply during both 
peacetime and armed conflict (e.g. the obligation to disseminate Geneva Conventions) and may be 
found in both IHL and GHRL treaties (e.g. the Geneva Conventions as well as the CWC  and the 
CRC).  
The nature of the equality principle shall be examined from this holistic view of 
international law. The rationale of the principle of equality of belligerents is to induce compliance 
with norms related to armed conflict in order to minimize the effects thereof.38 Regardless of 
whether parties to the conflict include aggressor States which have violated jus ad bellum or 
ANSAs which have violated domestic law, all parties shall be subject to the same rules relating to 
armed conflict so that they are more inclined to respect them.39  
                                                
34 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3. 
35 Ang, supra note 33, paras. 58–64. 
36 Note however that it is possible to argue that this provision applies during peacetime by virtue of Common Article 1 
which states that “[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention 
in all circumstances.” See J.S. Pictet et al. (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary I, Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1960) 
(Commentary I), at 26. 
37 M. Happold, ‘The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict’, 3(1) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 226 (2000), at 236. 
38 Helle, supra note 17, at 801. 
39 J. Somer, ‘Jungle Justice: Passing Sentence on the Equality of Belligerents in Non-International Armed Conflict’ 
89(867) IRRC 655 (2007), at 659. 
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Two aspects of the equality principle shall be clarified in light of this rationale. First, the 
equality principle applies to all norms concerning armed conflict regardless of whether they are IHL 
norms or GHRL norms. For example, in accordance with Article 1 of the CWC (a GHRL norm), all 
potential belligerents are prohibited from manufacturing chemical weapons during peacetime in 
order to ensure that the use of chemical weapons does not occur during armed conflict.  
Second, while the equality principle promotes the parity between belligerents, a disparity of 
obligations may exist in practice because the principle does not strictly apply to GHRL norms 
concerning armed conflict. As Sandoz explains, “the principle of equality [...] does not mean that, in 
practice, each party has exactly the same rights and obligations”,40 because parties to a conflict may 
have different conflict-related GHRL obligations while having exactly the same rights and 
obligations as far as IHL norms are concerned.41 For instance, the CWC may create different 
obligations between parties to the conflict, if a belligerent is not a party to the Convention. This 
flexible application of the equality principle is justified through not only the gravity of the matter 
(i.e. chemical weapons shall never be used regardless of whether enemy belligerents use such 
weapons) but also its applicability during peacetime. 
The disparity between belligerents is particularly conspicuous between States and ANSAs. 
For instance, the obligation to disseminate the Geneva Conventions applies only to States and not to 
ANSAs, because this obligation is a GHRL norm which applies during peacetime.42 Further, given 
that ANSAs are not parties to any human rights treaties, there is an imbalance between ANSAs and 
States bearing obligations “to observe – possibly more restrictive – [general] human rights law in 
the course of a non-international armed conflict [...]”.43 This significant disparity between States 
and ANSAs may be explained by the difference in capacity to implement such obligations, as well 
as States’ reluctance to explicitly acknowledge ANSAs’ obligations during peacetime, because they 
are faced with a dilemma between (a) the desire to induce compliance and (b) the fear of 
legitimizing ANSAs. The prohibition of recruiting child soldiers is an exception; the undeniable 
reality that many children are recruited by ANSAs during both peacetime and armed conflict has 
compelled States to explicitly impose legal obligations on ANSAs under GHRL.  
                                                
40 Y. Sandoz, ‘International Humanitarian Law in the Twenty-first Century’, 6 Yearbook of International Humanitarian 
Law 3 (2003), at 9. 
41 IHL applies reciprocally between belligerents (i.e., if some norms are inapplicable to one party, they are inapplicable 
to all other party to the conflict in the relationship between them). See Common Article 2 of the four Geneva 
Conventions. 
42 Common Article 2 of the four Geneva Conventions provides: “In addition to the provisions which shall be 
implemented in peacetime [...].”  
43 Henckaerts and Wiesener, supra note 3, at 151. 
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2.  Object and Purpose:  
 
Article 31(1) of the VCLT provides: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith [...] in the light of 
its object and purpose [...].” The object and purpose of the OP is to address the “failure” of the CRC 
(which failed to directly bind ANSAs)44 by prohibiting the recruitment of child soldiers by ANSAs 
during both peacetime and armed conflict45 and to raise the minimum age for recruitment to 18 
years.46 Regarding the former, the Preamble of the OP states: 
 
Condemning with the gravest concern the recruitment, training and use within and 
across national borders of children in hostilities by armed groups distinct from the 
armed forces of a State, and recognizing the responsibility of those who recruit, train 
and use children in this regard.47  
 
A commentary to the OP states that “[t]he importance of the provision [Article 4] lies in the fact 
that many child soldiers are recruited by rebel groups in internal conflicts, whereas the CRC only 
applies to States Parties”.48 The rationale to prevent ANSAs using of child soldiers was to react to 
the reality on the ground, where most child soldiers were found in the forces of ANSAs. At the time 
of drafting, the number of children recruited into both State armed forces and ANSAs was 
growing.49 In fact, “[a] survey published in 1998 estimated that, internationally, there could be 
around 300,000 children under 18 serving in governmental or insurgent armed forces”, 50 
approximately 70% among them in the ranks of ANSAs.51 The reporter of The Working Group on a 
Draft Optional Protocol (Working Group) noted:  
 
                                                
44 Brett, supra note 17, para. 1. 
45 This was a “major issue” for the drafters: Vandewiele, supra note 17, para. 56. 
46 The reporter to the Working Group states that the aim is “to achieve a universal agreement, on raising the minimum 
age for recruitment into armed forces and other groups [...]”: E/CN.4/1999/73, 24 March 1999, para. 10. See also, 
Happold, supra note 37, at 227. 
47 Preamble of the OP, para. 11. 
48 Vandewiele, supra note 17, para. 56. 
49 Happold, supra note 37, at 226. 
50 Ibid. 
51 P. Gazagne, ‘Engaging Armed Non-state Actors on the Issue of Child Recruitment and Use’ in D. Nosworthy, Seen, 
but Not Heard: Placing Children and Youth on the Security Governance Agenda 239 (2009), at 254. 
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As a large portion of children currently involved in armed conflicts are not dependent 
on regular armed forces, but on other groups and forces, it was generally felt that the 
prohibition against recruitment and participation of children in hostilities should be in 
relation to both governmental armed forces and other armed groups, including irregular 
armed forces, rebel groups, etc., and that a separate article in the Optional Protocol 
should call for such a prohibition.52  
 
Similar to Article 38 of the CRC, the need to prohibit the recruitment of child soldiers during 
peacetime has led States to regulate this matter in a GHRL treaty rather than an IHL treaty,53 
because the applicability of the prohibition of child soldiers under AP II54 is extremely limited.55 
The reporter of the Working Group further stated: “It was also felt that the OP should apply to all 
situations, not only those of armed conflict.”56 The prohibition of the recruitment of child soldiers 
was thus inserted in a GHRL instrument in order to prevent such practices in instances where even 
IHL is inapplicable.57 In fact, the OP filled the lacuna in IHL, which does not prohibit ANSAs not 
parties to an armed conflict from recruiting children. Thus, the OP “supplement[s] the existing 
instruments in [IHL]”,58 because the prohibition of recruitment during peacetime is essential to 
ensure compliance with the prohibition of the use of child soldiers during armed conflict.  
The OP also seeks to raise the minimum age of recruitment to 18 years from that of 15 years 
under customary international law. As Coomaraswamy states, “it is generally agreed by States that 
the recruitment and direct participation of children under the age of fifteen in armed conflict is 
prohibited as a matter of customary international law”.59 The ICRC affirms this in its study of 
customary international law,60 at least for the minimum age of 15.61 The ICRC cites practice and 
                                                
52 E/CN.4/1995/96, supra note 10, para. 24. See also, E/CN.4/1998/102, 23 March 1998, para. 32.  
53 The OP “builds upon the earlier incorporation of humanitarian law into the Convention on the Rights of the Child”: 
Henckaerts and Wiesener, supra note 3, at148. Note that they use the term “humanitarian law” in a large sense, which 
includes all norms related to armed conflict. 
54 Article 4(3)(c) of AP II provides: “Children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in 
the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities”. 
55 See Article 1 AP II. 
56 E/CN.4/2000/WG.13/CRP.1/Rev.1, supra note 15, para. 38. See also, R. Brett, supra note 17, para. 19.  
57 H.-J. Heintze, ‘Theories on the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law’ in R. Kolb 
and G. Gaggioli (eds.), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 53 (2013), at 61. For a similar 
view, see V. Gowlland-Debbas and G. Gaggioli, ‘The relationship between international human rights and humanitarian 
law: an overview’ in R. Kolb and G. Gaggioli (eds.), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 77 
(2013), at 83. 
58 E/CN.4/1995/96, supra note 10, para. 21. 
59 Coomaraswamy, supra note 15, at 539. 
60 J.-M. Henckaerts et al. Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume 1, Rules (2005), at 482. 
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opinio juris as evidence, including several treaty provisions adopted by consensus (inter alia, 
Article 77(2) of AP I, Article 4(3)(c) of AP II, the CRC and the OP), national practice, national 
legislation, practice of international organizations, and practice of international judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies.62 Further, the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the Sam Hinga Norman case 
confirmed that customary international law prohibits both States and ANSAs from recruiting and 
using children under 15 years in hostilities and that the violation of this customary norm constitutes 
a war crime.63 Arguably, this custom applies during time of peace and time of armed conflict.64 
Premised on this customary norm, the OP seeks to develop the law by raising the minimum age to 
18 years. 65 Thus, Article 4(1) of the OP shall be interpreted in light of these objectives as well as 
the context of the CRC and IHL.     
 
 
3. Contextual Interpretation in Light of the CRC, the Four Geneva 
Conventions, and Article 4(3) of the OP 
 
Article 31(1) of the VCLT provides: “A treaty shall be interpreted [...] in their context [...].” First, 
the OP shall be interpreted in light of the CRC because the former addresses the “failure” of the 
latter.66 Second, a treaty shall be interpreted by “comparing the term in question with the analogous 
wording of a related treaty”.67 Given that the OP relates to IHL, it “should be interpreted in line 
with their meaning under IHL”.68 Third, the contextual interpretation means that “the interpreter of 
                                                                                                                                                            
61 Ibid., at 485, “Although there is not, as yet, a uniform practice with respect to the minimum age for recruitment, there 
is agreement that it should not be below 15 years of age”. 
62 J.-M. Henckaerts et al. Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume 2, Practice (2005), at 3109–3127. 
63 Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga 
Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), SCSL, Appeals Chamber, 31 May 2004, para. 22. 
64 M. Sassòli, ‘Le Droit International Humanitaire, Une Lex Specialis Par Rapport Aux Droits Humains?’ in A. Auer et 
al. (eds.), Les droits de l’homme et la constitution, Etudes en l’honneur du Professeur Giorgio Malinverni 375 (2007), 
at 385. Sassòli states that there is no boundary separating IHL and GHRL in customary law. Note also that Article 38 of 
the CRC and the OP apply during peacetime. 
65 E/CN.4/1999/73, supra note 46, para. 10; Happold, supra note 37, at 227. 
66 R. Brett, supra note 17, para. 1. 
67 O. Dörr and K. Schmalenbach, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (2012), at 543. 
68 Ang, supra note 33, para. 16. 
  
14 
any phrase in a treaty has to look at the treaty as a whole”.69 As such, Article 4(1) will be examined 
in light of Article 4(3). 
 
A. The Context of the CRC: From the Prevention of Direct Participation in Hostilities to the 
Prohibition of Use of Children in Hostilities by ANSAs 
In accordance with the principle of distinction, civilians enjoy protection against direct attack unless 
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.70 In order to protect children in particular, 
Article 38(2) of the CRC requires States Parties to “take all feasible measures to ensure that persons 
who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities”. Article 1 of the 
OP raised the minimum age of direct participation in hostilities to 18 years.71 Article 4 of the OP 
reinforces Article 38(2) of the CRC and Article 1 of the OP. First, while the latter provisions 
encompass situations where children take a direct part in hostilities as members of ANSAs, they 
only impose a legal obligation on States to prevent such situation without binding ANSAs. 
Therefore, Article 4(1) of the OP fills this gap by imposing an obligation on ANSAs to not use 
children in hostilities.72 Second, the OP creates a lower threshold for the criminalization of the “use 
[of children] in hostilities” by ANSAs than the threshold for the loss of protection against direct 
attack during “direct participation in hostilities”. In other words, ANSAs may be criminalized even 
                                                
69 Dörr and Schmalenbach, supra note 67, at 543. 
70  See ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International 
Humanitarian Law (2009). Recommendation VII states, “Civilians lose protection against direct attack for the duration 
of each specific act amounting to direct participation in hostilities, whereas members of organized armed groups 
belonging to a non-State party to an armed conflict cease to be civilians, and lose protection against direct attack, for as 
long as they assume their continuous combat function”. 
71 Note that some States expressed that “the optional protocol should not qualify the prohibition on participation of 
children in hostilities, and that the prohibition on participation should be very broadly construed to prevent both direct 
and indirect participation in armed conflicts”: E/CN.4/1996/102, 21 March 1996, para. 28. However, the final text, 
which makes this differentiation in Article 1, was adopted by consensus. 
72 It shall be noted that Article 4(1) prohibits both direct and indirect participation of children in hostilities, because it 
employs the phrase “use in hostilities” rather than “direct participation in hostilities”. It appears that the drafters 
intended to cover both direct and indirect participation in hostilities, deliberately using the phrase “use in hostilities” in 
Article 4(1) of the OP, which is a synonymous expression of the phrase “take part in hostilities” used in Article 4(3)(c) 
of the AP II. Throughout the drafting negotiation, participating States have extensively discussed the issue whether the 
OP should cover indirect participation in hostilities. In this sense, Ethiopia expressed that “the Ethiopian delegation had 
consistently supported a strong optional protocol that would raise the minimum age for the recruitment and participation 
of children in hostilities to 18 years without any qualification as to direct or indirect participation. However, it had 
become apparent that such a strong protocol was not realistically achievable for consensus adoption”: 
E/CN.4/2000/WG.13/CRP.1/Rev.1,, supra note 15, para. 135. 
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if they use children under 18 to indirectly participate in hostitlities (i.e. “activities objectively 
contributing to the military defeat of the adversary” and “political, economic or media activities 
supporting the general war effort”73), while the children participating in such activities still retain 
protection against direct attack. Third, Article 4(2) of the OP specifies that the reference to “all 
feasible measures”, to be taken by States includes “the adoption of legal measures”.  
 
B. The Context of IHL: Obligation to Respect and Ensure Respect  
Vandewiele claims that while Article 4 creates only a moral obligation on ANSAs, it imposes a legal 
obligation on States Parties to “prevent the recruitment and use of persons under the age of 18 years 
by armed groups [...]”.74 However, this assertion ignores the basic principle of IHL which shall be 
taken into account as the context of the OP. Following the approach taken by the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) in its Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute judgment, which compared 
analogous wording in related treaties,75 this question shall be answered in light of relevant IHL 
provisions.   
The Geneva Conventions create not only a negative obligation on ANSAs that are parties to 
a conflict to respect IHL under CA3, but also a positive obligations on States to “ensure respect 
[faire respecter]” under Common Article 1. As such, States are required to take effective measures 
to prevent ANSAs from violating IHL.76 Similarly, Article 4(1) of the OP creates a negative 
obligation on ANSAs to refrain from recruiting or using child soldiers, whereas States have a 
positive obligation to prevent such recruitment and use under Article 4(2). As Cullen states, “Article 
4 of the Optional Protocol places an absolute obligation on non-state forces not to recruit children, 
but it places an obligation on states to take all feasible measures to ensure that [the recruitment of 
children] does not occur.”77 It appears that Article 4 of the OP followed this basic structure of the 
Geneva Conventions. 
 
                                                
73 ICRC, supra note 70, at 51. Such activities include “design, production and shipment of weapons and military 
equipment, construction or repair of roads, ports, airports, bridges, railways and other infrastructure outside the context 
of concrete military operations [...] political propaganda, financial transactions, production of agricultural or non-
military industrial goods [...]”. 
74 Vandewiele, supra note 17, paras. 61 and 63. 
75 Judgment, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras, Nicaragua Intervening), ICJ, 
1992, para. 374. 
76 Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ 
2004, para. 146; Commentary I, supra note 36, at 26. 
77 Cullen, supra note 15, at 118. 
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C. The Internal Context: Article 4(3) Addressing States’ Dilemma 
The effectiveness principle, usually described by the maxim “ut res magis valiat quam pereat”, is 
an accepted principle of treaty interpretation.78 This principle rests on the presumption that every 
word (or provision) has a legal significance; thus, if two interpretations are possible, the one that 
generates the most effect must be adopted.79 The ICJ has affirmed this principle in a number of 
cases, including Corfu Channel and Georgia v. Russia.80  
The insertion of Article 4(3) in the OP81 attests to the legal effect of Article 4(1), as “other 
provisions of the same treaty” may lead to “a certain reading of the disputed term”.82 The reason 
why the drafters included Article 4(3) is because Article 4(1) imposes a legal obligation on ANSAs. 
In other words, the sole purpose of Article 4(3) is to reassure the States Parties that conferring 
international obligations to ANSAs will not legitimize them, thus addressing the dilemma between 
the desire to impose legal obligations on ANSAs and the reluctance to recognize them as equal 
parties. If Article 4(1) had no legal effect, Article 4(3) would have been unnecessary. The CRC, for 
example, does not contain any provision similar to Article 4(3) of the OP, because the CRC does not 
impose a legally binding obligation on ANSAs. Therefore, as the ICJ puts it, “[i]t would indeed be 
incompatible with the generally accepted rules of interpretation to admit that a provision of this sort 
[...] should be devoid of purport or effect”.83  
Further, this formulation follows the basic principle of IHL that the conferment of 
obligations to ANSAs will not change their legal status. Common Article 3(2) provides: “The 
application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.” 
This provision was inserted because CA3 creates legally binding obligations for ANSAs. Similarly, 
Article 4 of AP I provides: “The application of the Conventions and of this Protocol, as well as the 
conclusion of the agreements provided for therein, shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to 
                                                
78 Advisory Opinion, Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (Second Phase), ICJ, 1950, 
at 229. 
79 A. Watts, The International Law Commission 1949-1998: Volume Two: The Treaties (2000), at 684. 
80 Judgment, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), ICJ, 1949, para. 51; Judgment, Case Concerning Application 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian 
Federation), ICJ, para. 134 (Georgia v. Russia). See also, Judgment, Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the 
District of Gex (France v. Switzerland), PCIJ, 1932, at 13. 
81 Article 4(3) provides: “The application of the present article under this Protocol shall not affect the legal status of any 
party to an armed conflict”.   
82 Dörr and Schmalenbach, supra note 67, at 544. See also, Judgment, Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related 
Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), ICJ, 2009, paras. 77–79 and 84. 
83 Corfu Channel, supra note 80, at 24. 
  
17 
the conflict.” Again, this is to ensure that the legal status of ANSAs, in particular national liberation 
movements, which have the same obligations as States, remains unchanged. 
 
In sum, both teleological and contextual interpretations indicate that Article 4(1) creates a legally 
binding obligation on ANSAs. However, some argue that the use of the word “should” instead of 
“shall” creates only moral obligations.84 This issue shall be addressed in the next section. 
 
 
4. “Shall” or “Should”: Does It Matter? 
 
While some argue that “should” means a recommendation, Clapham states, “Using an interpretation 
that stresses ordinary meaning, the word ‘should’ normally denotes an obligation when addressed to 
a third person [...] The difference between ‘you should leave’ and ‘you shall leave’ seems more 
semantic than substantive.”85 In order to determine the meaning of “should” under Article 4(1) of 
the OP, this section comprehensively analyzes the use of “should” in a variety of treaties – including 
the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, the CRC, the 1951 Convention, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),86 the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),87 and the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)88 – and the nature of obligations 
created therein. This study demonstrates that the choice between “shall” and “should” is not 
essential in determining the nature of the obligation. Rather, the words that precede or follow these 
terms determine whether the provision imposes stronger or weaker obligations (see subsection A, 
below). This section also elucidates that, in English language versions of treaties, the word “should” 
usually accompanies provisions that create weaker obligations (see subsection B, below). Finally, 
an analysis of these provisions (i.e. the provisions in which the word “should” is used in the English 
text) in other official treaty languages – including French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, and Arabic – 
clarifies that these languages generally use the same word (an equivalent of “shall”) for both strong 
                                                
84 See P. C. Szasz, ‘General Law Making Processes’ in O. Schachter and C. C. Joyner (eds.), United Nations Legal 
Order (1995), at 46 and cited in Clapham, supra note 15, at 75. 
85 Clapham, supra note 15, at 75. Note however that this is a minority opinion.  
86 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171. 
87 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3. 
88 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465 UNTS 85. 
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obligations and weaker obligations, reinforcing the assertion that the use of “should” is irrelevant 
for determining the nature of an obligation (see subsection C, below).  
 
A. The Choice of “Shall” or “Should” Does Not Determine the Nature of Obligation 
One needs to avoid a simplistic, binary conception that the word “shall” always denotes strong 
obligations whereas “should” imposes weaker obligations, because both words may convey varying 
obligations depending on the wording of the entire provision. For instance, the 1951 Convention 
creates both strong and weaker obligations without using the word “should”. Numerous provisions 
within the 1951 Convention stipulate that “[t]he Contracting States shall accord to a refugee 
treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to 
aliens generally [...]”.89 Under these provisions, the Contracting States have a weaker obligation to 
accord treatment as favourable as possible,90 as well as a strong obligation to accord treatment not 
less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally. Similarly, Article 34 states, “The Contracting 
States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees.” This 
provision imposes a legal obligation on States to facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of 
refugees, while it is a “minimalist obligation”91 given the expression “as far as possible”.92  
Conversely, the word “should” may be used to create strong or weaker obligations 
depending on the wording of the text. For instance, Article 18(2) of the 1949 Geneva Convention 
III provides: “At no time should prisoners of war be without identity documents. The Detaining 
Power shall supply such documents to prisoners of war who possess none.” Despite the use of the 
word “should”, the expression “[a]t no time” denotes a strong obligation.93 Thus, it is safe to 
conclude that the difference between “shall” and “should” is “more semantic than substantive”.94 
                                                
89 Such provisions include Articles 13, 18, 19, 21, 22(2), and 26.  
90 J. C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law (2005), at 200. Hathaway states, “the duty to grant 
refugees ‘treatment as favorable as possible’ requires a state party to give consideration in good faith to the non-
application to refugees of limits generally applied to aliens”. 
91 Ibid., at 988. Hathaway states that Article 34 imposes only a “minimalist obligation, [and] it really cannot be said that 
even steps which diminish opportunities for refugees to obtain citizenship are clearly unlawful”.  
92 R. Marx, “Article 34 (Naturalization),” in A. Zimmermann et al. (eds.), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol  : a Commentary 1441 (2011), at 1451. However, Marx states that “this provision takes 
the form of a recommendation”. 
93 J.S. Pictet et al. (eds.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary III, Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1960) (Commentary III), at 168. This provision “stipulates that at no time should 
prisoners of war be without identity documents. As we have already seen in connection with Article 17, the Detaining 
power must therefore supply an identity document in place of any individual service record which it impounds”. Note 
also that the French text employs the expression “ne devront se trouver”, which denotes a strong obligation. 
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B. “Should” Usually Accompanies Provisions that Create Weaker Obligations 
While it does not determine the nature of obligation, the word “should” usually accompanies 
provisions that create weaker obligations. In this regard, there are five types of weaker obligations. 
First, the word “should” usually accompanies provisions creating obligations of conduct, which 
require States (or other entities) to “endeavour” or “take steps” towards a certain ideal or outcome. 
Such obligations are contrasted with obligations of result which entail violations thereof if the 
expected outcome is not achieved, regardless of efforts being made. Examples of obligations of 
conduct include Common Article 3(2) of the Geneva Conventions and Articles 64(1)95 and 66(1)96 
of AP I. Common Article 3(2) provides, “The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to 
bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present 
Convention.” A commentary states that, to this effect, parties to the conflict are “under an obligation 
to try to bring about a fuller application of the Convention by means of a bilateral agreement”.97 It 
shall be noted that, as stated above, obligations of conduct may be created using strong expressions 
such as “shall” or “undertake”. For instance, Article 2(1) of the ICESCR employs the strong word 
“undertakes”, while the provision creates an obligation of conduct because of the expression “take 
steps”.   
Second, the word “should” is usually employed when the obligation is contingent upon 
circumstances, accompanied by expressions such as “if possible”, “where”, “if suitable”, “if 
available”, “as appropriate”, etc. Examples of such provisions include Articles 16,98 17,99 and 
                                                                                                                                                            
94 Clapham, supra note 15, at 75.  
95 See, however, Y. Sandoz et al. (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1987) (Commentary on the APs), para. 2558, where it states that this provision “is only 
a recommendation”. The French text employs the conditional tense “deverait”. 
96 See Ibid., para. 2652. The French text employs the conditional tense “devraient être identifiables”. 
97 Commentary I, supra note 36, at 43. The commentary states, “The provision does not merely offer a convenient 
possibility, but makes an urgent request, points out a duty: ‘The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor [...]’ 
Although the only provisions which each of the Parties is bound to apply unilaterally are those contained in Article 3, 
they are nevertheless under an obligation to try to bring about a fuller application of the Convention by means of a 
bilateral agreement”. Note that the French text uses a strong expression “s’efforceront”. 
98 Commentary I, supra note 36, at 161. The commentary states, “The obligation is an absolute one; and the Powers 
must accordingly take all the necessary preparatory steps in good time, and even before the commencement of 
hostilities, in order to ensure that the competent authorities are in a position to perform their duties”. Note also that the 
French text employs a strong word “devront”.  
99 Ibid., at 176-177. The commentary states, “Clearly it must be taken to imply an obligation. According to Littré's 
French dictionary, the expression  ‘veiller à’ (ensure) means ‘prendre garde à’ (see to it). The Parties to the conflict have 
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40(5)100 of GC I; Articles 19,101 20,102 and 42(3)103 of GC II; Article 27(1)104 of GC III; Article 
50(4) of GC IV; Article 41(1)(a) of the ICCPR;105 Article 21(1)(a) of the CAT;106 and Articles 
19(2)107 and 26(2)108 of the CRC. In relation to children, Article 50(4) of GC IV states, for example, 
“Particulars of their parents or other near relatives should always be recorded if available.” This 
means that the State has a legal obligation to record “any available particulars of their father and 
mother or other near relatives, such as the place and date of birth, nationality, last known domicile, 
special marks, etc.”.109 In other words, these provisions must always be respected whenever the 
circumstances described in the provision exist. 
                                                                                                                                                            
therefore to "see to it" -- that is to say, to make certain -- that the prescribed task, for which they are responsible, is duly 
carried out. There is no justification for thinking that the task in question is optional. On the contrary, in calling upon 
the Parties to the conflict to ensure that it is carried out, the Convention is once more drawing attention to the 
importance of the task and to the necessity for accomplishing it”. Note that the French text employs a strong word 
“restera”.  
100 See Ibid., at 313. Note that the French text employs a strong expression “sera établie”.  
101 See J.S. Pictet et al (eds.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary II, Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1960) 
(Commentary II), at 140-142. Note that this provision is essentially identical to Article 16 of GC I and Article 50 of GC 
IV. The French text employs a strong word “devront”.  
102 See Ibid., at 149. The French text employs a strong word “restera”. 
103 See Ibid., at 237. The French text employs a strong expression “sera établie”. 
104 See Commentary III, supra note 93, at 201. The French text employs a strong expression “seront utilisés”. 
105 M. Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2005), at 766. This commentary states, 
“The most important obligation on the State concerned is that within three months it must transmit to the State that 
submitted the communication some sort of written statement on the accusations. this statement should above all include 
references to relevant domestic procedures and remedies”. Note that the French text employs a strong word “devront”. 
106 M. Nowak, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Commentary (2008), at 712 (italics in original). This 
commentary states, “The wording of Article 21 CAT is taken almost literally from Article 40 CCPR”. Note that the 
French text employs a strong word “devront”. 
107 S. Detrick, A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1999), at 322–326. The 
French text uses the strong word “doivent”. 
108 W. Vandenhole, Article 26: The Right to Benefit from Social Security, A commentary on the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 26 (2007); Detrick, supra note 107 at 445–449. The French text employs a 
strong word “doivent”. 
109 Commentary IV, supra note 5, at 289. This commentary states, “To this end it is laid down that any available 
particulars of their father and mother or other near relatives, such as the place and date of birth, nationality, last known 
domicile, special marks, etc., must always be recorded”. Note that the French text employs a strong expression “seront 
toujours consignées”.  
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Third, the word “should” is usually utilized when the State enjoys a certain margin of 
appreciation to implement its obligations. Such provisions include Article 52(2)110 of GC I; Article 
53(2)111 of GC II; Article 132(2)112 of GC III; Article 149(2) of GC IV;113 Articles 59(5),114 60, and 
64(2)115 of AP I; and Article 23(1)116 of the CRC. Article 60 of AP I, for example, provides that an 
agreement of demilitarized zone “shall be an express agreement” in which Parties “should define 
and describe, as precisely as possible, the limits of the demilitarized zone [...]”. While Contracting 
Parties enjoy a certain margin of appreciation regarding the content of the agreement, this provision 
imposes a strong obligation that such an agreement cannot be a tacit one.117 In other words, 
Contracting Parties have a legal obligation to ‘define and describe’ the demilitarized zone but the 
degree of specificity is “left to the judgment of the Parties to the conflict”.118 It is inconceivable that 
Parties have only a moral obligation to describe the demilitarized zone, because, without such 
description, they would not be able to know where the demilitarized zone exists. Such interpretation 
would render this provision devoid of any legal effect.  
Fourth, the word “should” is used when provisions set out general rules but allow 
exceptions. Examples of such provisions include Article 110(2) of GC III;119 and Articles 18(3),120 
                                                
110 Commentary I, supra note 36, at 378-379. This commentary states, “It is intended to provide for cases where the 
Parties to the conflict do not reach agreement on the procedure for the enquiry. But in such cases it is still necessary to 
agree on the choice of an umpire who will decide upon the procedure to be followed”. Note that the French text 
employs a strong expression “entendront pour choisir”. 
111 See Commentary II, supra note 101, at 272. The French text employs a strong expression “s’entendront pour 
choisir”.  
112 See Commentary III, supra note 93, at 631-633. The French text employs a strong expression  “s’entendront pour 
choisir”. 
113 See Commentary IV, supra note 5, at 605. The French text employs a strong word “s’entendront”. 
114 Commentary on the APs, supra note 95, paras. 2287-2288. The French text states, “devrait déterminer et indiquer, de 
manière aussi précise que possible, les limites de la localité non défrendue”. 
115 See, however, Ibid., para. 2564, where it states, “Finally, international co-ordination of civil defence activities is only 
‘recommended’ (in contrast with the international co-ordination of relief actions (22)) to Parties receiving assistance and 
those providing it, if there is reason to do so”. The French text uses the conditional tense “devraient faciliter”. 
116 Detrick, supra note 107 at 377–390. The French text employs a strong word “doivent”. 
117 Commentary on the APs, supra note 95, para. 2307. This commentary states that “[t]his paragraph clearly says that 
the agreement cannot be a tacit one: it requires that a consensus ad idem of the Parties be clearly expressed. The mere 
notification, when it remains unanswered, is insufficient”.. 
118 Ibid., “The form of the agreement, the manner in which it is concluded and its contents, are left to the judgment of 
the Parties to the conflict”.  
119 See Commentary III, supra note 93, at 519-521. The French text employs a strong expression “seront rapatriés”. 
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23(1),121 66(3),122 and 75(7)(a)123 of AP I. Article 23(1) of AP I provides that “medical ships and 
craft [...] should be marked with the distinctive emblem [...]”. This provision lays down a general 
rule but allows for exceptions. According to a commentary, States are allowed to “assign ships and 
craft to medical tasks without delay in case of emergency” without marking them with the 
distinctive emblem.124 However, when the State is capable of marking with the distinctive emblem, 
it is obligated to do so.125 
Fifth, “should” may be used in provisions which create obligations contingent upon the 
capacity of the entity, accompanied by expressions such as “to the fullest extent of the means 
available”. Such instances can be seen in, for example, Article 55(1) of GC IV126 and Article 10 of 
the ICESCR. In this regard, the latter provides that “[t]he widest possible protection and assistance 
should be accorded to the family [...]”.127 It is generally accepted that this provision creates a legally 
binding obligation, although it “is subject to the principle of progressive realization” depending on 
the means available to the States Parties.128 
The five aforementioned types of obligations are not mutually exclusive. For example, 
Article 34 of the 1951 Convention, which states that “[t]he Contracting States shall as far as 
possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees”, creates an obligation of conduct 
                                                                                                                                                            
120 See, however, Commentary on the APs, supra note 97, para. 763, where they state that “the introduction of the 
expression ‘should be recognizable’ (in French “se feront en règle générale reconnaître”) is the result of compromise. 
This means that personnel should be provided with such emblems and cards, but that it is not made a condition sine qua 
non of protection”. The French text uses the expression “se feront en règle générale”.  
121 The provision states that “[...] such vessels should be marked with the distinctive emblem and as far as possible 
comply with the second paragraph of Article 43 of the Second Convention”. The obligation to mark medical ships with 
the distinct emblem is a general rule, while the obligation to comply with the form under Article 43 of GCII is an 
obligation of means. The French text employs the conditional tense “devraient être”. 
122 See Commentary on the APs, supra note 95, para. 2658. The French text uses the expression “se fera en règle 
générale”. 
123 See Ibid., para. 3141. The French text uses the conditional tense “devraient être”. 
124 Ibid., para. 901. 
125 See, however, Ibid., para. 901, where it states that the compliance to this provision “is recommended as far as 
possible with the proposals contained in the second sentence of paragraph 1”. 
126 Commentary IV, supra note 5, at 309. This commentary states that “the Occupying Power is placed under an 
obligation to ensure, to the fullest extent of the means available to it, the food and medical supplies of the population”. 
Note that the French text employs a strong word “devra”. 
127 The French text uses a strong word “doivent”. 
128 B. Saul et al., The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Cases, Materials, and 
Commentary (2014), at 725-726. Note also that “certain obligations in respect of Article 10 plainly may have immediate 
effect”: Ibid. 
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to facilitate, as well as affording States a certain margin of appreciation as to the content of 
“facilitation” depending on the means available to them. 
In sum, although “should” usually accompanies provisions that create weaker obligations, the 
difference between “shall” and “should” is negligible because both words may create strong or 
weaker obligations. In fact, all provisions in the operative part of a legally binding treaty create 
legal obligations – whether strong or weak – rather than moral obligations. Arguing that the word 
“should” creates only moral obligations would render many well-established provisions void of any 
legal effect. If States seek to create moral obligations (or soft law), they do it through non-binding 
documents (e.g. General Assembly resolutions), or the preambular part of a treaty.129 For instance, 
the Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons 130  – a soft law instrument – has a series of recommendations including 
Recommendation E, which expresses: 
 
the hope that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees will have value as an 
example exceeding its contractual scope and that all nations will be guided by it in 
granting so far as possible to persons in their territory as refugees and who would not be 
covered by the terms of the Convention, the treatment for which it provides.  
 
As such, Contracting Parties have no legal obligation to extend the protection of the 1951 
Convention to refugees who fall outside the contractual scope of the Convention, but as per the 
above, it is recommended that they do so.131  
 
C. Lost in Translation? The Nuance of “Should” in Other Languages 
Article 33 of the VCLT provides that “[w]hen a treaty has been authenticated in two or more 
languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language” and that “[t]he terms of the treaty are 
presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text”. As Lord MacNair states, “there is 
ample authority for the view that the two or more texts should help one another, so that it is 
                                                
129 Soft law does not create a legal effect per se, although it may be taken into account for interpretive purposes. See 
Judgment, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America), ICJ, 1986, para. 188; Judgment, Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing 
the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v. Sweden), ICJ, 1958, at 67; Judgment, South West Africa cases (Second 
Phase) (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), ICJ, 1966, at 34. 
130 1951 Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless 
Persons, Geneva, Switzerland. July 2-25, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/108/Rev.1. 
131 G. S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (2007), at 36. 
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permissible to interpret one text by reference to another”.132 Following the interpretive method 
adopted by the ICJ in Georgia v Russia, in which the Court examined a variety of treaties to 
determine the meaning of the term ‘dispute’ found in the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),133 this section first examines the 
wording of the above provisions (i.e. the provisions in which “should” appears in the English text 
(‘the should provisions’)) in other authentic languages (see subsection 1, below),134 and then 
analyzes the five other authentic texts of the OP (see subsection 2, below).  
 
1. Absence of “Should” in Other Languages 
In the five other UN official languages, the modal varieties such as “shall”, “must”, “ought to”, and 
“should” do not exist, with the exception of Russian. In Russian, while the particle “бы” may be 
attached to the basic form “должeн” (must) to soften the stringency of the word (the equivalent of 
“should” in English), this particle is not utilized in legally binding treaties. As such, none of the 
should provisions uses the particle “бы”; the word “должeн” (must) is thus used whether the 
provision creates a strong obligation or a weaker obligation.135 In French and Spanish, the only way 
to express the subtle difference between “shall” and “should” is through the use of the conditional 
tense, although its use is extremely rare in both languages. In French, most of the should provisions 
employ the present tense (“doivent”) or the future tense (“devront”), except for Articles 23(1), 
59(5), 60(2), 64(1), 64(2), 66(1), 75(7)(a) of AP I, in which the conditional tense “devrait” or 
“devraient” is used. In Spanish, all of the should provisions employ the present tense “debe”136 or 
the future tense “deberá”137 except for Articles 19(2) and 26(2) of the CRC, in which the conditional 
tense “deberían” is used. In Chinese and Arabic, the conditional tense does not exist.138 Given that 
the subtle difference may not be expressed through the use of the conditional tense, in Chinese, the 
                                                
132 A. MacNair, The Law of Treaties (1961), at 433. 
133 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 UNTS 195.  
134 Note that the authentic texts of the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are only in English and 
French. Other human rights treaties are authenticated in all six UN official languages.  
135 See, for example, Article 41(1)(a) ICCPR; Article 21(1)(a) CAT; Article 23(1) CRC; and Article 10(1) ICESCR in 
which the word “should” is used in the English text. 
136 Article 10(1) ICESCR. 
137 Article 23(1) CRC. Note also that the future tense “hará referencia” is used in Article 41(1)(a) ICCPR and Article 
21(1)(a) CAT. 
138 In Chinese, there is no present, past, future, or conditional tense. Given that Chinese does not have any verb 
conjugations, timeframes and conditionality are expressed by adding particles such as “了”and “应”to the simple 
form of the verb. In Arabic, there are only two tenses (moods): past (perfect) and present (imperfect). 
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present tense of the words that denote obligation such as “應在”139 and “應給”140 is used for both 
strong and weaker obligations. Similarly, legal instruments in Arabic use the present tense or the 
noun form, including 141  and 142  respectively, regardless of the stringency of 
obligation.  
Why is the conditional tense used in French and Spanish on an ad hoc basis? It may be 
explained by the process through which treaties in other languages are authenticated. Today, most 
treaties are first drafted in English and then translated into other languages,143 whereas, up until the 
1960s, French was the main language of diplomacy. Thus, it appears that the use of the conditional 
tense in French or Spanish depends on the translators who may or may not reflect the nuance of 
“should” in the English text. In French, the conditional tense only appears in AP I, which was 
mainly negotiated in English. On the other hand, the present or future tense is used throughout the 
four Geneva Conventions, in which the French language played an important role during the 
drafting process. Nonetheless, it does not mean that the text in other languages are inaccurate or less 
important, given that all texts are equally authentic and have the same meaning.144 For instance, the 
insertion of the expression “en règle général” in Articles 18(3) and 66(3) of AP I specifies the type 
of obligations these provisions create (i.e. weaker obligations that set out general rules but allow 
exceptions), whereas the English text merely states “should”.145  
In sum, all five other UN languages hardly express the subtle difference between “shall” and 
“should”; the nature of obligation may only be discerned through the expression such as “en règle 
générale” or “si possible”. In fact, the same rule applies to English as well, given that the use of 
“shall” may create weaker obligations and the use of “should” may create strong obligations. 
Bearing this rule in mind, the OP in other languages shall be examined in order to determine the 
nature of the obligation under Article 4(1), because “consulting the different authentic texts may be 
viewed as an interpretative tool that assists in determining the ordinary meaning of treaty terms”.146  
    
                                                
139 Article 41(1)(a) ICCPR; Article 21(1)(a) CAT. 
140 Article 10(1) ICESCR. 
141 Article 41(1)(a) ICCPR; Article 21(1)(a) CAT. 
142 Article 10(1) ICESCR. 
143 For example, Most WTO agreements are negotiated in English and then translated into French and Spanish: Bradly 
J. Condon, “Lost in Translation: Plurilingual Interpretation of WTO Law” 1(1) Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement 191 (2010), at 191-192. 
144 Article 33 VCLT. 
145 Note that the French text of these provisions use the future tense “se feront” and “se fera”.  
146 Condon, supra note 143, at 195. 
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2. Article 4(1) of the OP in Other Authentic Texts 
The OP was first drafted in English and subsequently translated into French, Spanish, Russian, 
Chinese, and Arabic, all of which are equally authentic under Article 13 of the OP. An examination 
of these texts “can help disambiguate one version with the help of the ‘clear’ text of another [...]”.147 
The ICJ affirms this interpretive method in Georgia v Russia, where the Court examined all the 
authentic texts of the ICERD to decide whether Article 22 establishes procedural conditions to 
submit a case to the Court.148 
With regard to the OP, the French text reflects the nuance of “should” by using the conditional 
tense “devraient”. As such, Article 4(1) provides:  
 
Les groupes armés qui sont distincts des forces armées d'un État ne devraient en 
aucune circonstance enrôler ni utiliser dans les hostilités des personnes âgées de moins 
de 18 ans. 
 
Given that this provision relates to the regulation of armed conflicts, it seems that the translators for 
the French text followed the formulation of AP I, whereas other human rights treaties consistently 
use the present or future tense.  
The Spanish text uses the present tense “no deben”. As such, Article 4(1) provides:  
 
Los grupos armados distintos de las fuerzas armadas de un Estado no deben en ninguna 
circunstancia reclutar o utilizar en hostilidades a menores de 18 años.  
 
The expression ‘no deben’ is generally translated to English as “must not”.149 This expression may 
be used for both strong and weaker obligations. For instance, Article 9(3) of the ICCPR, which 
creates a strong obligation, provides, “La prisión preventiva de las personas que hayan de ser 
juzgadas no debe ser la regla general [...].” The same provision in English uses the phrase “shall 
not”. On the other hand, “deben” is also used in Article 10(1) of the ICESCR, which creates a weak 
obligation.  
As stated above, legal instruments in the Russian language do not use the particle “бы” to 
diminish the rigorousness of the word “должeн” (must). As such, Article 4(1) provides:  
 
                                                
147 O. Corten and P. Klein, The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (2011), p.  883. 
148 Georgia v. Russia, supra note 80, para. 135. 
149  Deben - Diccionario Inglés-Español WordReference.com, 
http://www.wordreference.com/es/en/translation.asp?spen=deben (last accessed 30 June 2014). 
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Вооруженные группы, отличные от вооруженных сил государства, ни при каких 
обстоятельствах не должны вербовать или использовать в военных действиях 
лиц, не достигших 18-летнего возраста. 
 
In Russian, “должeн” is the only word that denotes obligation, which is generally translated as 
“must”.150 The word “должeн” without the particle “бы” may therefore be used for both strong and 
weaker obligations. For example, Article 42(2) of the ICCPR, which creates a strong obligation, 
provides: “Члены Комиссии выполняют обязанности в своем личном качестве. Они не 
должны быть гражданами заинтересованных Государств- участников или Государства […].” 
The same provision in English employs the expression “shall not”. On the other hand, the word 
“должeн” is also used to create weaker obligations.151  
Given that the Chinese language does not have any verb conjugations, the Chinese text of 
Article 4(1) uses “不得” in its simple form. As such, Article 4(1) provides: 
 
非国家武装部队的武装团体在任何情况下均不得招募或在敌对行动中使用不满 18 
周岁的人.  
 
“不得” is generally translated to English as “must not”, “may not”, or “cannot”.152 “不得” usually 
accompanies provisions that create strong obligations. For instance, this term is used in Article 4(2) 
of the ICCPR:  
 
2. 不得根据本规定而克减第六条、第七条、第八条(第一款和第二 款)、第十一条、
第十五条、第十六条和第十八条。 
 
It goes without saying that Article 4(2) of the ICCPR, which limits the scope of derogation, creates 
a strong obligation on States Parties. Similarly, Article 6(5) of the ICCPR, which creates a strong 
obligation, also uses the term “不得”. The English text of Article 6(5) employs the expression “shall 
not”. 
                                                
150 Должен - Русско-английский Словарь На WordReference.com, http://www.wordreference.com/ruen/до
лжен (last accessed 30 June 2014). 
151 See, for example, Article 41(1)(a) ICCPR; Article 21(1)(a) CAT; Article 23(1) CRC; and Article 10(1) ICESCR. The 
English text of these provisions use the word “should”. 
152  Chinese-English Dictionary, 
http://www.mdbg.net/chindict/chindict.php?page=worddict&wdrst=0&wdqb=不得  (last accessed 30 
June 2014). 
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Given that the Arabic language may not express the subtle difference between “should” and “shall” 
through the use of the conditional tense, the Arabic text uses the present tense or the noun form 
whether the provision creates a strong or weaker obligation. As such, Article 4(1) provides:   
 
“ ” denotes obligation and is generally translated into English as “shall not”, or “not 
allowed”.153 This expression usually accompanies provisions that create strong obligations. For 
instance, Article 4(2) of the ICCPR provides: 
 
 
 
The term “ ” is also employed in Article 6(5) of the ICCPR: 
 
 
 
As stated above, the English text of the same provision uses the expression “shall not”. 
 
In sum, it is reasonable to conclude that Article 4(1) of the OP imposes a legal obligation on 
ANSAs, given that four authentic texts leave no doubt with regard to its legally binding nature. 
Because the use of “should” or the conditional tense creates – whether stronger or weaker – legal 
obligations when used in the operative part of a treaty, the expressions “should” and “devraient” –
employed in the English and French texts respectively – shall be interpreted as binding ANSAs. 
This interpretation is in line with the ICJ’s decision in LaGrand. When faced with a similar 
problem, the Court held that provisional measures are legally binding, although the expression 
                                                
153 English Arabic Dictionary, http://www.arabdict.com/english-arabic/اﺍلﻝ%20زﺯوﻭجﺝيﻱ (last accessed 30 June 
2014).  
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“ought to” is used in the English text of the Statute of the Court.154 The Court acknowledged that 
the expressions “ought to” in English and “doivent” in French “are not in total harmony”.155 
Considering the Statute’s intention, the Court held: “It follows from the object and purpose of the 
Statute, as well as from the terms of Article 41 when read in their context, that the power to indicate 
provisional measures entails that such measures should be binding [...] The contention that 
provisional measures indicated under Article 41 might not be binding would be contrary to the 
object and purpose of that Article.”156 Similarly, it could be argued that Article 4(1) is legally 
binding given the object and purpose of the OP and the terms of Article 4(1) when read in their 
context; the contention that it is a moral obligation would be contrary to the object and purpose of 
the OP to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers by ANSAs.  
In light of the foregoing analysis on the text’s object and purpose, context, and the meaning 
of the word “should”, Article 4(1) imposes a legal obligation on ANSAs. Yet, it is still ambiguous 
why the drafters used the word “should” instead of “shall” and imposed different obligations on 
States and ANSAs. A comprehensive analysis of the drafting history should shed light on these 
issues.   
 
 
5. Travaux Préparatoires: Taking ANSAs’ Capacity Into Account 
 
Article 32 of the VCLT provides that one may have recourse to “the preparatory work of the treaty” 
as a supplementary means of interpretation. This section first explains that the travaux 
préparatoires attest to the drafters’ intention to impose a legal obligation on ANSAs (see subsection 
A, below) and then argues that the use of the word “should” and the differential treatment between 
States and ANSAs may be explained by the drafters’ desire to take into account both the equality 
principle and the capacity of ANSAs (see subsection B, below).  
 
A. Intention to Impose a Legal Obligation on ANSAs  
The Working Group on a Draft Optional Protocol held six sessions between 1995 and 2000. 
Throughout these sessions, participating States engaged in a heated debate on the proposed 
obligations of ANSAs, which was heavily influenced by the dilemma between the desire to prohibit 
ANSAs from recruiting child soldiers and the reluctance to recognize them as equal parties. There 
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were four predominant views among the participants: first, impose a legal obligation on ANSAs by 
using the word ‘shall’ (Approach A); second, create a legal obligation on ANSAs by using the word 
‘should’ (Approach B); third, impose a legal obligation only on States Parties to take effective 
measures to prevent ANSAs’ recruitment without addressing the latter’s obligations (Approach C); 
and fourth, create merely a moral obligation on ANSAs and address the issue only in the 
preambular part (Approach D).  
During the first session, many participants supported either Approach A or B. The 
reporter to the first session noted that many States “felt that the prohibition against 
recruitment and participation of children in hostilities [by ANSAs]” shall be dealt with in “a 
separate article in the Optional Protocol”.157  
Australia, Nigeria, Mexico, the Netherlands, Columbia, the Philippines, Poland, Norway, 
India, China, Sweden, Canada, Egypt and the UK promoted Approach A, proposing to employ the 
word “shall”.158 On the other hand, France endorsed Approach C, proposing a provision which 
merely states that “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that” children are not 
“recruited by non-governmental parties[...]”.159 
During the second session, many participating States seem to support either Approach A or B. 
The reporter states: 
 
It was pointed out that most armed conflicts nowadays were not international wars but 
rather internal civil conflicts in which non-State armed forces were involved. It was felt 
that the protocol would be failing in its aim of protecting children from involvement in 
armed conflicts unless it addressed the problem of children serving in non-governmental 
armed forces or groups. The view was expressed by many participants that the use of 
children as soldiers by any group should be prohibited by the Optional Protocol.160  
 
However, some States preferred Approach C. The reporter notes: “At the same time, many 
delegations were cautious, wishing to avoid equating groups with States parties and not to provide 
recognition to such groups in an international legal document.”161 The reporter continues:   
 
While some delegations felt it necessary for the protocol to cover non-governmental 
armed forces since they could be a party to a conflict, others preferred to refer only to 
the responsibility of States as subjects of international law. It was argued that States 
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would not be in a position to guarantee that non-governmental armed groups would 
abide by the protocol, and that the fact of mentioning them in the protocol could give 
them a legal status and international ambitions. The general feeling [of all participating 
States] was that the obligation of a State party should be to take all feasible measures to 
ensure that armed groups in its territory abided by the protocol, and that a reference to 
non-governmental armed forces should therefore be made in the protocol.162 
 
In this session, the Working Group began its discussion on whether ANSAs should be bound by the 
OP based on the following four propositions: 
 
1. In the case of armed groups, children who have not attained the age of 18 years shall 
neither be recruited nor be allowed to take part in hostilities. 
2. Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty 
of a State or the responsibility of the Government, by all legitimate means, to maintain 
or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial 
integrity of the State. 
3. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent the use of their territories to 
encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of such activities. 
4. States Parties shall apply legal sanctions to persons committing or ordering to be 
committed a breach of paragraph 1 of this article. [Approach A] 
OR 
All parties in armed conflicts should respect the provisions contained in articles 1 and 2 
of the present Protocol regarding the involvement of children therein in accordance with 
applicable international humanitarian law. [Approach B] 
OR 
1. [Children] [Persons] who have not attained the age of 18 years [shall] [should] 
neither be used in hostilities nor recruited by any party to any armed conflict [other than 
a State]. 
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure the application of this article. 
[Approach A or B] 
OR 
The State Parties shall ensure to the extent possible, including throughout legal 
measures, that the provisions of articles 1 and 2 of the present Protocol are respected by 
other - non-governmental - armed groups operating within their territories. Non-
governmental armed groups, parties to the armed conflicts or hostilities shall be 
responsible for the full observance of the prohibition indicated/contained in article 1; 
the provisions of this article shall not affect the legal status of the non-governmental 
parties to the conflict or hostilities.163 [Approach A] 
 
The first and fourth options endorse Approach A by using the word “shall”, whereas the second 
option supports Approach B. The third option demonstrates that the Working Group is divided on 
the word ‘should’ or ‘shall’ (Approach A or B). The Netherlands, Mexico, and Norway supported 
Approach A; they endorsed the second option and proposed to ‘replace the word “should” by the 
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word “shall” and to add, at the end of the article, the following sentence: “The application of the 
preceding provision shall not affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict”.164 Meanwhile, 
France persistently favoured Approach C, proposing to place an obligation not on ANSAs but on 
States Parties.165 Japan and the US preferred Approach B, supporting the second option.166 It 
appears that France succeeded in promoting Approach C; at the end of this session, the provision 
concerning ANSAs’ obligation read as follows: “States Parties shall take all feasible measures, 
including any necessary legislation, to prevent the recruitment of persons under the age of 18 years 
[of minors] subject to their jurisdiction by non-governmental armed groups [which are parties to] 
[involved in] an armed conflict”.167 
During the third session, many States seem to prefer Approach A or B. The reporter to the 
third session states:  
 
Strong support was given by many participants to the inclusion of a clause preventing 
child recruitment by non-governmental armed groups, bearing in mind that most child 
soldiers were said to be currently serving in non-governmental armed groups. Without 
such a clause, it was felt that the Optional Protocol would lose much of its force [...] A 
reference was also made to the international humanitarian law applicable in situations of 
non-international armed conflicts which binds all parties to a conflict, including armed 
groups, without giving them a legal status.168 
 
While Pakistan,169 China, Cuba, India, Brazil, Columbia, and Peru170 supported Approach D,171 
many States wished to maintain an article dealing with ANSAs in the operative part of the OP. The 
following States expressed to retain such an article in the operative part: the Netherlands, Norway, 
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Australia, Denmark, Slovakia, Japan, Uruguay, the US, Finland, Sweden, Nigeria, the UK, Chile, 
Austria, Estonia, Germany, Czech Republic, Canada, France, Romania, and Switzerland.172   
During the fourth session, many States favoured Approaches A, B, or C. The reporter of the 
Working Group notes:  
 
Most delegations believed that the protocol should reflect the reality of the situation in 
the world today, where most armed conflicts take place within States and most under-
age combatants serve in non-governmental armed groups. The future protocol should 
therefore also address, in its operative part, the situation of child soldiers recruited by 
non-governmental entities.173  
 
Nonetheless, “[a] preference was voiced for this issue to be addressed in the preambular part of the 
document only”. 174  The Working Group began its discussion based on Article 3 of the 
Chairperson’s perception paper, which had been submitted to the Commission on Human Rights.175 
Article 3 provides:  
 
l.  Persons under the age of l8 years should not be recruited into armed groups, distinct 
from the armed forces of a State, which are parties to an armed conflict. States Parties 
shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment. 
2. The application of the present provision under the Protocol shall not affect the legal 
status of any party to an armed conflict.176 [Approach B] 
 
Ethiopia, Switzerland, Denmark, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Belgium considered the 
wording of Article 3 acceptable, therefore supporting Approach B.177 Particularly, Switzerland 
stated, “It was essential that the optional protocol should contain a provision prohibiting the 
recruitment of children under the age of 18 by combatants which were not part of the regular armed 
forces.”178 The Netherlands seemed to prefer Approach A, stating, “The article on recruitment by 
armed groups was not completely satisfactory, but could stand as a compromise.”179 Meanwhile, 
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Cuba reiterated its support for Approach D, expressing that this Article “should remain in the 
preamble”.180 
The report on the fifth session has little information on the matter. In this report, the 
participating States’ particular views are not mentioned. Nonetheless, the reporter states that the aim 
of the Working Group is “to achieve a universal agreement, on raising the minimum age for 
recruitment into armed forces and other groups [...]”.181  
During the sixth session, participating States finally adopted Approach B by consensus, 
though making substantive changes to Article 3 of the Chairperson’s perception paper.182 The 
report on the sixth session contains little information on how the Working Group has arrived at the 
final text of the OP. Nonetheless, it can be reasonably inferred that most States preferred Approach 
B for the following three reasons. First, the Working Group rejected Approach D despite strong 
oppositions from a few States, such as Cuba. Second, despite France’s tenacious endorsement 
thereof, the Working Group also discarded Approach C. Third, the final document uses the word 
“should” despite the Netherlands’ firm demand for the word “shall”.  
The legally binding nature of Article 4(1) may also be inferred from the four modifications 
made to Article 3 of the Chairperson’s perception paper.183 First, the drafters changed the subject of 
the sentence to “Armed group” instead of “Persons under the age of 18 years” and changed the verb 
to the active voice. This modification marks the shift from the individual right to freedom from 
recruitment to the obligation of an entity not to recruit them, clarifying that the obligation is on 
ANSAs.184 Second, the final text divides the provisions on States Parties and ANSAs, which 
indicates that the drafters intended to create distinct obligations for each. Third, the drafters inserted 
the phrase ‘under any circumstances’, which indicates that the prohibition applies during peacetime, 
that “the drafters intended to create an obligation that allowed for no derogation”,185 and that it 
prohibits any sort of involvement of children in armed conflict even in case of reprisals, voluntary 
recruitment, or indirect participation in hostilities. Fourth, the phrase “which are parties to an armed 
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conflict” was deleted in order to apply this obligation during both peacetime and armed conflict. As 
such, it is safe to conclude that the drafters deliberately formulated Article 4 in its current form so as 
to impose a legal obligation on ANSAs.186 
 
B. Reasons for the Use of “Should” and Differential Treatment: Different but Equal Treatment 
Taking into Account the Capacity of ANSAs 
Why did the drafters use the word “should” instead of “shall” and impose different obligations to 
States and ANSAs? There may be two reasons. First, the OP is a result of a compromise between 
diverging opinions of the participating States.187 As stated above, some States – including Pakistan 
China, Cuba, India, Brazil, Columbia, and Peru – expressed concern that the conferment of legal 
obligations to ANSAs would legitimize them. It may be argued that the word “should” instead of 
“shall”, which gives the impression that States and ANSAs are different, was adopted in order to 
reassure these States that ANSAs are not equal parties, although the legal effect remains 
unchanged.188 Similarly, the differential treatment between ANSAs and States was adopted as a 
compromise between the majority of participants that urged for the “Straight-18” rule189 and a 
minority of States that wished to recruit children under 18 under “certain conditions and in certain 
circumstances”.190  
                                                
186 See, however, a statement made by the ICRC that Article 4(1) “imposed a moral, as opposed to legal, obligation 
under international law”: E/CN.4/2000/WG.13/CRP.1/Rev.1, supra note 15, para. 108. Nonetheless, the ICRC also 
claims that Article 4(1) is binding on ANSAs: see supra note 15. 
187 UNICEF, Ethiopia, and Finland stated that the Protocol was a compromise: E/CN.4/2000/WG.13/CRP.1/Rev.1,, supra 
note 15, paras. 102, 136, and 140. 
188 Note that this differentiation is not made in CA3 or AP II because they do not have separate provisions for States and 
ANSAs; the provisions bind both States and ANSAs as “each Party to the conflict”.  
189 See E/CN.4/1995/96, supra note 10, paras. 25-26, where it states, “It was argued the true nature of ‘voluntary’ was 
often open to question and that the degree of real voluntariness remained problematic. It was also pointed out that child 
soldiers did not choose the circumstances they faced. In practice, they often had no real choice other than to participate 
in armed conflicts. The view was also expressed that the distinction between voluntary and compulsory recruitment 
would be very difficult to enforce in practice”. 
190 Ibid., para. 24. “The vast majority of participants expressed their willingness to prohibit the participation of persons 
under the age of 18 in hostilities. However, several delegations argued that, while all efforts should be made in order to 
avoid the participation of children in armed conflicts, this should not prevent States from recruiting, on a voluntary 
basis, persons below the age of 18 into their armed forces, when their national legislation allowed it under specific 
conditions and circumstances. In elaborating their views, some delegations referred to the economic difficulties faced 
by their countries and stated that the army was sometimes the only solution to mitigate a high rate of unemployment 
among young people. It was also emphasized that being recruited did not necessarily lead to participation in hostilities.” 
Such a compromise may also be observed in the differential treatment between States and ANSAs with respect to direct 
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Second, the drafters’ desire to take into account both the principle of equality and the 
capacity of ANSAs may explain their decision to use the word “should” and to impose different 
obligations on States and ANSAs. The drafters’ intention to respect the equality principle appears in 
the Preamble of the OP, which states that “this Protocol is without prejudice to [...] relevant norms 
of humanitarian law”. 191  In this regard, the Reporter of the Working Group states, “Some 
delegations expressed their concern about the interrelationship between an optional protocol and 
some of the already established principles and norms of international humanitarian law, and the 
need for the provisions of the draft optional protocol to be consistent with those principles and 
norms.”192 During the drafting of the OP, it was expressed that “the draft optional protocol was not 
in contradiction with international humanitarian law but rather could supplement the existing 
instruments in this field”.193  
The drafters thus considered that the OP does not undermine the equality principle, because, 
as stated above, the principle does not strictly apply to GHRL norms concerning armed conflict. 
First, the OP brings States and ANSAs closer to an equal footing by prohibiting ANSAs from 
recruiting child soldiers during peacetime, whereas States are already prohibited from doing so 
under Article 38 of the CRC and Article 3 of the OP. If ANSAs were not bound by Article 4(1) of 
the OP, as some argue, it would give rise to disproportionately stringent obligations on States, 
because, by virtue of Article 3 of the OP, States may not recruit anyone under 16 and must respect 
strict rules for voluntary recruitment for children under 18, whereas IHL only prohibits ANSAs to 
recruit children under 15. As such, if one were to follow their argument, Article 3 of the OP only 
creates a moral obligation because “the obligation imposed on [States] differs from, and is wider 
than, that imposed on [ANSAs]”.194 Second, the OP creates different but balanced obligations; 
while States have a positive obligation under Article 4(2) to ensure that children under 18 are not 
recruited by ANSAs and further are required to implement strict conditions for voluntary 
recruitment under Article 3, ANSAs only have a negative obligation to refrain from recruiting and 
using children in hostilities, though the age limit is higher. Third, the difference of obligations is 
negligible in practice. Article 3(1) of the OP requires States Parties to raise the minimum age of 
                                                                                                                                                            
and indirect participation; while Article 4(1) of the OP prohibits ANSAs from using person under 18 to participate 
(directly or indirectly) in hostilities, it allows States to use persons under 18 to take an indirect part in hostilities (if they 
were voluntarily recruited) under Article 1. See supra note 72. 
191 Preamble, para. 13. Here, the term “humanitarian law” is used in a large sense, not limited to norms only applicable 
during armed conflicts. 
192 E/CN.4/1995/96, supra note 10, para. 21. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Helle, supra note 17, at 801. 
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voluntary recruitment from 15. Consequently, more than two-thirds of States Parties have accepted 
the “Straight-18” rule,195 placing themselves on an equal footing with ANSAs.  
The drafters imposed different obligations on States and ANSAs in order to take into 
account the capacity of ANSAs. As the maxim “Lex Non Cogit Ad Impossibilia” (the law does not 
compel the impossible) expresses, there is a well-accepted principle under international law that an 
obligation may not be imposed if the entity is incapable of implementing it.196 The drafters argue 
that “the exceptions permitted in the Optional Protocol for recruitment under eighteen have strict 
conditions and that non-state armed actors, not having the institutions and the processes of a State, 
would not be able to meet those conditions”.197 By “strict conditions”, the drafters are referring to 
Article 3(3) which provides that States Parties “shall maintain safeguards to ensure” that such 
recruitment is “genuinely voluntary” and “is done with the informed consent of the person's parents 
or legal guardians”, and such persons “are fully informed of the duties involved in such military 
service” and “provide reliable proof of age prior to acceptance into national military service”. Given 
that most ANSAs do not possess “the institutions and the processes of a State”, ANSAs must 
respect the “Straight-18” rule because they are unable to ensure that “such recruitment is genuinely 
voluntary”.198 This rule also applies to States Parties if they are incapable of respecting the “strict 
conditions”. The OP requires States Parties to establish a safeguard system ensuring that the 
recruitment of persons under 18 is not coerced.199 If States Parties are unable to implement such 
safeguard measures, they must accept the same ‘Straight-18’ rule as ANSAs.  
The drafters’ intention to take into account both the equality principle and the capacity of 
ANSAs also explains the choice of the word “should”. Whereas the expression “under any 
circumstances” suggests the “strongest kind of international legal obligation”,200 the word “should” 
usually accompanies provisions that create weaker obligations including obligations contingent 
upon the capacity of the entity.201 Therefore, it may be interpreted that Article 4(1) allows an 
exception in extremely rare circumstances where ANSAs are unequivocally incapable of respecting 
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199 Article 3(2) provides: “Each State Party shall deposit a binding declaration upon ratification of or accession to this 
Protocol that sets forth the minimum age at which it will permit voluntary recruitment into its national armed forces and 
a description of the safeguards that it has adopted to ensure that such recruitment is not forced or coerced”. 
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Article 4(1). For example, while ANSAs have an absolute obligation to check “proof of age” to 
ensure that the person is not under 18, ANSAs are not held liable for this obligation if the proof 
turns out to be counterfeit, given that ANSAs are incapable of verifying the authenticity of the proof 
because the official records are in the hands of the State. On the other hand, States Parties are 
strictly held liable in the same situation because they are capable of verifying the authenticity of the 
proof at their Ministry of Interior. While the authentic texts in Spanish, Russian, Chinese, and 
Arabic may be read as not permitting this exception because they do not make a subtle difference 
between “shall” and “should”, as in the English and French texts, this restrictive interpretation is in 
line with the approach taken by various international courts. The Permanent Court of International 
Justice in Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions held that: 
  
where two versions possessing equal authority exist one of which appears to have a 
wider bearing than the other, [the Court] is bound to adopt the more limited 
interpretation which can be made to harmonize with both versions and which, as far as 
it goes, is doubtless in accordance with the common intention of the Parties.202  
 
Given that this interpretive method is a standard operating procedure,203 it is reasonable to conclude 
that Article 4(1) allows an exception in extremely rare circumstances. This interpretation reconciles 
all authentic texts and the object and purpose of the OP by taking the common denominator of 
different texts while satisfying the objective to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers.204 
 
 
6. Subsequent Practice of States and ANSAs 
 
Article 31(3)(b) of the VCLT provides that “[t]here shall be taken into account [...] any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation”. The subsequent practice of both States and ANSAs attests to the legally binding 
nature of Article 4(1). 
                                                
202 Judgment, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Britain), PCIJ, 1924, at 19. The European Court of 
Human Rights similarly adopts this restrictive interpretation: Judgment, Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws 
on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium, Application No 1474/62, ECtHR, 1968, para. 38. 
203 Note however that this is not a general rule: ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’, II 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1966), at 225. 
204 Article 33(4) of the VCLT provides that “when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning 
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First, the States Parties tacitly recognized the assertion made by various UN organs that 
Article 4(1) of the OP imposes legal obligations on ANSAs. More recently, the Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on Syria stated: “Anti-Government armed groups are also 
responsible for using children under the age of 18 in hostilities in violation of the CRC-OPAC, 
which by its terms applies to non-State actors.”205 Similarly, the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict stated: “The Optional Protocol, adopted in 
2000, prohibits the forced recruitment of children under the age of 18 years by armed forces and 
armed groups and their direct participation in hostilities.”206 None of the States Parties to the OP has 
contested this view shared by the Commission and the Special Representative.207 Such unanimous 
omission to protest the UN organs’ publicly-declared view constitutes subsequent practice 
confirming the States Parties’ conviction that the OP is binding on ANSAs.208   
Second, many ANSAs themselves have expressed that they will not recruit or use children 
under the age of 18 years in hostilities. In 2005, the Security Council established a monitoring and 
reporting mechanism on six “grave violations” of children’s rights committed by States and 
ANSAs, one of them being “recruiting and using child soldiers”.209 This mechanism dissuades non-
compliance through the ‘naming and shaming’ approach and the possibility of sanctions by the 
Security Council.210 As such, ANSAs that recruit child soldiers are “to be listed in an Annex of the 
Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict, which can lead to sanctions being 
                                                
205 A/HRC/22/59, 5 February 2013, para. 44. See also, A/HRC/27/60, 13 August 2014, para. 92, where the Commission 
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imposed against such groups”.211 In order to be removed from the list, ANSAs are encouraged to 
submit an “action plan” to the Security Council.212 In addition to the fear of sanctions, ANSAs have 
a number of other incentives to submit such a commitment; it increases legitimacy and support in 
the international community, enables them to criticize the government’s human rights violations, 
and elevates their position vis-à-vis other ANSAs.213 The Special Representative has received such 
commitments from more than seventy ANSAs. 214 Further, like the UN’s monitoring and reporting 
mechanism, the Deed of Commitment project initiated by Geneva Call provides another mechanism 
to seek ANSAs’ compliance with the prohibition of the recruitment of child soldiers. In this 
mechanism, ANSAs engage in inclusive dialogues and are encouraged to sign a Deed of 
Commitment, which states that they “commit” to “adhere to a total ban on the use of children in 
hostilities” and “to ensure that children [under 18] are not recruited into our armed forces, whether 
voluntarily or non-voluntarily”.215 Geneva Call receives regular reports from ANSAs and monitors 
their compliance with the Deed.216 If ANSAs sign the Deed, they may receive humanitarian 
assistance for children including “rehabilitation of schools, access to vocational training, job 
creation initiatives, access to vaccination campaigns, water and sanitation supply”.217 As of June 
2014, ten ANSAs have signed the Deed.218  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
As the title of this paper suggests, the OP does not break legal barriers between IHRL and IHL, 
because in reality, such barriers do not exist. Rather, the OP assists in deconstructing the deep-
rooted myth within academia that IHL is an autonomous system distinct from IHRL. This imaginary 
barrier is a product of the different disciplines of international law including “international 
humanitarian law, refugee law, and human rights law [which] have largely evolved around their 
own specific sources, institutions, and ethos”.219 Each of these disciplines maintains different 
conceptions of international law, which are largely influenced by its professional bias.220 As Bianchi 
states, “a scientific paradigm ‘is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see whatever 
we look at’: it never occurs to us to take them off”.221 As such, we tend to prejudge the nature of 
obligation on the basis of the labels of treaties (i.e. IHL treaties, human rights treaties, and refugee 
conventions) which each discipline pretends to have authority over and alleges to provide the 
“correct” interpretation thereof. Such prejudice often leads to a precipitous conclusion conforming 
to the dominant view within each “interpretive community”.222 This professional bias has led us to 
misconceptualize the equality principle under international law as applying exclusively and 
narrowly to IHL, causing us to overlook something as basic as the rules of treaty interpretation 
under the VCLT. If we liberate ourselves from the shackles of our discipline and steadfastly apply 
Articles 31-33 of the VCLT, we cannot help but reach a conclusion that Article 4(1) of the OP is 
legally binding on ANSAs.     
The OP attests to the normative reality that IHRL is a holistic regime with multiple 
functions. Given that IHRL is an indivisible system which seeks to promote human rights and 
dignity during both peacetime and armed conflict, the two subsets of IHRL – namely, GHRL and 
IHL – complement and reinforce each other. IHL is especially dependent on GHRL because some 
conflict-related norms must apply during peacetime in order to ensure compliance with IHL. Article 
4(1) of the OP exemplifies such a mutually-reinforcing relationship between GHRL and IHL.   
As the application of conflict-related norms during peacetime suggests, international norms 
exist because the reality on the ground demands such norms. If we lived in an ideal world where no 
armed conflict exists, such norms would be unnecessary. Similarly, there would not be any norms 
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regulating ANSAs in a world without such entities. But the sad truth is that “armed groups are 
simply a reality, just as armed conflicts are a reality”;223 as such, international law regulates their 
conduct. ANSAs that are parties to a conflict are bound by CA3 and AP II, not because these 
instruments are so-called IHL treaties as opposed to human rights treaties, but because States were 
compelled to react – by concluding legally binding treaties – to the reality on the ground where 
most armed conflicts today are internal conflicts. In a similar vein, States have adopted the OP in 
response to the reality that many children are recruited by ANSAs during peacetime, which is 
governed by neither IHL nor the CRC. While the OP is the first GHRL treaty to directly impose 
obligations on ANSAs during peacetime, it will certainly not be the last one. If the situation on the 
ground demands it and if norms regulating such situations do not exist, States are likely to continue 
imposing direct obligations on ANSAs through GHRL treaties. The International Convention for 
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance224 and the African Union Convention 
for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa225 are testimony to this, 
although ANSAs’ legal obligations therein are not as clear as those contained in the OP. 
The academic discussions on the OP remind us that, in addition to the disciplinary barriers 
between GHRL and IHL, there exist language barriers within academia as a whole. In other words, 
we are influenced not only by the distinct languages spoken within different disciplines, but also by 
those temporally dominant within the academic world of international law. The dominance of 
English is particularly noticeable in the field of international law because most multilateral treaties 
are negotiated and analyzed therein. Through a comprehensive and comparative analysis of the use 
of the word “should” in other authentic texts, this paper reaffirmed that texts in other languages are 
not only equally authentic as the English text, but also invaluable in elucidating ambiguous words 
in the English text. It is hoped that this paper contributes to our collective effort to eliminate such 
language barriers, as well as imaginary hurdles between disciplines of international law, and instead 
encourage States officials, judges, academics, etc. to engage in judicial dialogues, 226  using 
multilingual and multidisciplinary approaches. 
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